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Abstract
This paper develops distribution-sensitive partial mean e¤ects of determinants
of out-of-pocket (OOP) catastrophic health payments. It also proposes methods
that can be used to measure how changes in the distribution of the correlates of
catastrophic health payments a¤ect the incidence of catastrophic health payments;
an inequality e¤ect. The proposed methods are then applied to Malawian data
from the Third Integrated Household Survey. The empirical application shows that
a failure to account for these inequalities in the correlates, at least normatively,
leads to a mismeasurement of the magnitudes of their partial e¤ects. The results
also indicate that the signs of the combined e¤ects of a ceteris paribus unit increase
in the mean and inequality e¤ects are mixed; for some variables the inequality e¤ect
dominates the mean e¤ect while for other variables a reverse pattern is observed.
Keywords: Mean e¤ect; inequality e¤ect; Malawi
1 Introduction
Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments on health care can be catastrophic if they severely disrupt
household living standards. Such catastrophic payments can threaten living standards
either in the short term through the sacrice of current consumption, or in the long term,
through depletion of assets, dissavings or accumulation of debts (Xu et al., 2003; Russell,
2004; Wagsta¤, 2006; Sparrow et al., 2013). Additionally, faced with illness, households
may decide to forgo treatment at the expense of depreciating their human capital (Sparrow
et al., 2013), and this may in turn also a¤ect future household welfare. The nancial
protection of households from catastrophic payments is a widely accepted conception of
fairness in health nance (WHO, 2000, 2010). Besides, the economic risks associated with
catastrophic health care payments have motivated the recommendation for health care
nance systems to transition towards some kind of pre-payment mechanism such as taxes
or universal medical insurance (WHO, 2005).
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Households face signicant binding constraints to reducing nancial catastrophe. The
identication of factors that inuence catastrophic health payments is signicant for health
nance policy as it provides useful insights into the constraints that should be removed
or relaxed to reduce or mitigate against the ill e¤ects of nancial catastrophe. The focus
of the existing literature on determinants of catastrophic health payments (e.g. Su et al.,
2006; Pal, 2012; Li et al., 2012; Narc¬et al., 2014) has been on the signs, magnitude,
and statistical signicance of the correlates of catastrophic health spending. In this case,
the signs and magnitude of marginal e¤ects are used to assess how the prevalence of
catastrophic health payments responds to changes in the average levels of the correlates.
However, in the extant literature, these mean e¤ects are not adjusted for income-related
inequalities.
The opportunity cost of health spending may not be the same between poor and
rich households (ODonnell et al., 2008). Consequently, from a social welfare perspective,
one might wish to place a normative interpretation on the relationship between the inci-
dence of catastrophic payments and its correlates, such that more weight is given to the
e¤ects of changes in factors that are concentrated among poorer households. Although
Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer (2003) develop distribution-sensitive aggregate measures of
the prevalence of catastrophic health spending, the idea is yet to be extended to the
study of determinants of catastrophic payments. Allowing for income-related inequalities
in the e¤ects of explanatory variables would thus ensure that the partial e¤ects reect
the di¤erentials in opportunity costs. Most importantly, a failure to account for these
socioeconomic inequalities in the partial e¤ects may at least normatively lead to a mis-
measurement of the partial e¤ects in terms of their magnitude, and hence, inaccurate and
misleading policy implications.
In addition to adjusting the partial mean e¤ects of the correlates for distribution
sensitivity, it may also be useful to see how changes in income-related inequalities in
the correlates themselves a¤ect the prevalence of catastrophic health payments. Does
rising income-related inequality in the correlates lead to an increase or a decrease in the
prevalence of catastrophic health payments? For instance, a rise in inequality in a factor
which in turn implies increasing concentration of the variable among the rich may lead to
a reduction or an increase in the incidence of catastrophic health payments depending on
how (in terms of sign) the factor a¤ects the likelihood of catastrophic health payments.
This paper addresses these shortcomings by making three contributions to the lit-
erature on OOP catastrophic health payments. First, the paper develops methods that
can be used to account for distribution-sensitivity in the partial e¤ects of explanatory
variables on the incidence of catastrophic health payments, a distribution-sensitive mean
e¤ect. Second, the paper proposes methods that can be used to measure how changes
in the distribution of the correlates of catastrophic health payments a¤ect the incidence
of catastrophic health payments, an inequality e¤ect. Finally, the proposed methods are
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then applied to Malawian data from the Third Integrated Household Survey.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops distribution-sensitive
partial mean e¤ects, and partial inequality e¤ects. Section 3 presents the Malawian
context, and describes the data and variables used. This is followed by the empirical
results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Methods
The two partial e¤ects that I develop in this paper are predicated on a linear regression
specication of average marginal e¤ects from a probit model of catastrophic health pay-
ments. This regression includes variables that are hypothesized to inuence the likelihood
of catastrophic health payments. The linearized partial e¤ects are then used to derive
methods for measuring how changes in the covariates and their income-related inequalities
a¤ect the incidence of OOP catastrophic health payments. I develop the methods next.
2.1 A partial e¤ects specication of a probit model
Consider a household i, and let si 2 [0; 1) be the share of per capita health spending in
total per capita household expenditure net of food. Total per capita household expen-
diture net of food measures a households ability to pay for health (Wagsta¤ and van
Doorslaer, 2003). One can alternatively dene the fraction of health spending without
deducting food expenditure. The share of a households OOP is considered catastrophic
if it exceeds a fractional threshold z i.e. si > z: Typically, binary probit or logit models
are used to model the determinants of catastrophic health payments (e.g. Su et al., 2006;
Pal, 2012; Li et al., 2012; Narc¬et al., 2014).
Let yi be a binary indicator of catastrophic spending dened as; yi = 1 if si > z,
and yi = 0 otherwise. The probability, p0i that a household incurs catastrophic OOP is
modelled using the following probit
p0i = Prob(yi = 1jxi) = 
 
0 +
X
k
kxik
!
(1)
where Prob() denotes probability,  () is the cumulative density function of the standard
normal distribution, 0 is an intercept, and k (k = 1; ::::K) are slope coe¢ cients for
covariates xik.
E¤ects of covariates on the probability of catastrophic health spending can be mea-
sured by using average marginal/partial e¤ects. For a continuous regressor xik; the average
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partial e¤ect is given by
@p0i
@xik
= k
1
N
X
i

 
0 +
X
k
kxik
!
(2)
where  () is the standard normal probability density function. The e¤ects of dummy
independent variables are calculated di¤erently from partial e¤ects with respect to contin-
uous variables discussed above. For these variables, the changes resulting from a discrete
(0 to 1) change in each dummy independent variable is simulated holding other things
constant.
Let the probability of catastrophic health payments for each household be approxi-
mated by a linear expression of the partial e¤ects as follows
p0i = +
X
k
mk xik + "i (3)
where  is an intercept, mk = k
1
N
P
i  (0 +
P
k kxik) ; N is the total number of
households in the sample, and "i is an approximation error. Since p0i are unobserved,
predicted probabilities from the probit, p^0i are used instead to estimate equation (3).
Interestingly, equation (3) suggests that the average partial e¤ect from the probit
model (equation (2)) can be approximated by estimating the slope coe¢ cients in this
linear regression. Averaging across equation (3) yields
p0 = +
X
k
mk xk + "i (4)
where p0 = 1N
P
i p0i =
1
N
P
i p^0i is a catastrophic health spending headcount, it gives
the proportion of households that incur catastrophic health payments, xk = 1N
P
ij xik is
the mean of covariate xik; and "i = 1N
P
i "i. The averages ignore sampling weights for
expositional purposes, however in the empirical application sampling weights are used.
Consequently, a distribution-insensitive change in the catastrophic headcount following a
change in the mean of covariate xik is
@p0
@xk
= mk : The existing literature has exclusively
focused on mk , and in cases where the logit model has alternatively been used, changes in
odds ratio have also been utilised when analysing the determinants of catastrophic health
payments.
2.2 Distribution-sensitive partial mean e¤ects
I weight the probabilities that a household exceeds the spending threshold p0i by weights
dened by Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer (2003). Let ri denote a households absolute
rank in ascending order of income or consumption expenditure. This is equal to 1 for the
poorest household, 2 for the second poorest household, and N for the richest household.
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The weights by Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer (2003) are dened as
mi = 2
N + 1  ri
N
(5)
Thus, mi = 2 for the poorest household i.e. ri = 1 , and mi = 2N for the richest household
i.e. ri = N: Taking an average of the weighted probabilities, mip0i; yields the distribution-
sensitive catastrophic payment headcount generated using a probit model as
pc0 =
1
N
X
i
mip0i (6)
= p0(1  C)
where C is a concentration index.
Result 1: The partial e¤ect of a change in the mean of a regressor on the distribution-
sensitive catastrophic health spending headcount is given as
@pc0
@xk
= mk (1  Ck) (7)
where Ck is the concentration index for xk. Ck > 0 if xik is concentrated among rich
households, and Ck < 0 if xik is concentrated among poor households.
Proof of Result 1: The concentration index for p0i is expressed as (see e.g. van
Doorslaer and Koolman (2004)),
C =
2
p0
cov(p0i; Ri) (8)
where, cov(:) is a covariance. Using Wagsta¤ et al. (2003), and substituting equation
(3) into the concentration index in equation (8) yields
C =
2
p0
cov(p0i; Ri) (9)
=
X
k

mk
xk
p0

Ck +
GC"
p0
where GC" is the generalised concentration index for "i. Finally, substituting equation
(9) into equation (6), and taking derivatives gives
@pc0
@xk
=
@p0
@xk
 

@p0
@xk
C + p0
@C
@xk

= mk  

mk C + p0

@C
@xk
+
@C
@p0
@p0
@xk

(10)
= mk   (mk C + mk Ck   mk C)
= mk (1  Ck)
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The distribution-sensitive partial e¤ect of a change in xk is therefore given as the
distribution-neutral partial e¤ect multiplied by the complement of the concentration index
of regressor xik.The sign of the distribution-sensitive partial mean e¤ect is still determined
by mk , but its magnitude is determined by how a regressor is distributed among nonpoor
and poor households. If an independent variable is equally distributed (Ck = 0), then the
distribution-sensitive and distribution-neutral partial e¤ects are equal i.e. @p
c
0
@xk
= @p0
@xk
=
mk : In this case, a failure to account for the distribution of the correlates would not lead
to a mismeasurement (at least in the normative sense) of the true magnitude of the e¤ect
of a change in xk.
However, the distribution-neutral partial mean e¤ect may overstate or understate the
size of the e¤ect when a correlate of catastrophic health spending is unequally distrib-
uted among the rich and the poor. If a variable in question increases the likelihood of
catastrophic health spending, and the variable is more concentrated among the rich i.e.
Ck > 0 , then
@pc0
@xk
< @p0
@xk
: Thus, the distribution-insensitive partial mean e¤ect overstates
the impact of xk on catastrophic health spending. In contrast, if there is a positive re-
lationship between catastrophic health payments and xik, but xik is more concentrated
among the poor i.e. Ck < 0 , then
@pc0
@xk
> @p0
@xk
: This means that the distribution-insensitive
partial mean e¤ect underestimates changes in the prevalence of catastrophic health spend-
ing.
2.3 Partial inequality e¤ects
Result 2: The partial e¤ect on the catastrophic health payments headcount of a change
in the distribution of a variable xik is
@pc0
@Ck
=  mk xk (11)
Proof of Result 2: Substituting equation (9) into equation (6) gives
pc0 = p0
"
1 
X
k

mk
xk
p0

Ck +
GC"
p0
#
(12)
and di¤erentiating with respect to Ck yields equation (11).
The marginal e¤ect of a change in the socioeconomic inequality of xk depends on
whether xk increases the probability of catastrophic health spending (i.e. 
m
k > 0 ) or
dampens it (i.e. mk < 0): A rise in inequality in xk, suggesting an increasing concentration
of the variable among the rich, leads to a reduction in the catastrophic headcount if mk >
0; and an increase in the headcount if mk < 0: In contrast, an increase in concentration of
xk among the poor i.e. a reduction in Ck; is associated with an increase in the headcount
if mk > 0, and a decrease in the headcount if 
m
k < 0:
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The two partial e¤ects, equations (7) and (11, essentially capture the mean e¤ect
and the inequality e¤ect respectively, of a regressor on the incidence of catastrophic
health payments. The two e¤ects are o¤setting in that they have opposite signs, and the
combined e¤ect of a ceteris paribus unit increase in the mean and inequality e¤ects is
then given as mk [(1  Ck)  xk]. The sign of the combined e¤ect depends on which of
the two dominates the other. For statistical inference in the empirical application, the
standard errors and t-statistics for the mean and inequality e¤ects are computed by using
a nonparametric bootstrap procedure (Efron and Tibshirani, 1986).
3 Empirical Application to Malawi
3.1 Context
Formal health care services in Malawi are dominated by two players namely; the govern-
ment and the Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM). For instance, over the
period 2002-2009, the government was providing an average of about 61% of health care
services, CHAMs contribution stood at 37%, and the remainder was covered by other
providers such as private practitioners and commercial companies (GOM, 2007, 2012). All
government facilities provide free health care services, with the exception of private wings
that exist in a small number of district hospitals and all central hospitals and outpatient
departments. Unlike government facilities, all CHAM facilities charge user fees, which are
heavily subsidized by the government and donors.
The health nance system in Malawi comprises the government, foreign donors, pri-
vate individuals and players through direct OOP payments, and medical insurance. Donor
funding dominates total health expenditure in Malawi. For example, over the period,
2005-2009, donor contributions accounted for an average of 60% of total health expen-
diture. Donor contributions rose from 46% to 66% of total health expenditure between
2002/03 and 2008/09, while the share public sector domestic nancing decreased from
35% to 18%. Household health expenditure shares in total health expenditures, mar-
ginally declined from 12.2% in 2002/03 to about 11% in 2008/09 (World Bank, 2013).
Malawi has no social medical insurance, and private medical insurance, plays a mar-
ginal role as a source of health care nance; for instance, private health insurance man-
aged an average of 3% of total health spending between 2007 and 2009 (GOM, 2012).
The limited availability of private health insurance is unlikely to change in a signicant
way. Malawi has a small formal sector from which health insurance premiums could be
collected with relative ease. Besides, the informal sector is characterised by low wages
and salaries. The presence of a predominantly free public health care system distorts the
incentive for households to insure against unexpected illness and the consequent medical
costs (GOM, 2012).
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The heavy reliance on donor funding to nance health expenditure is unsustainable
and leaves Malawi in a vulnerable position to external shocks such as aid suspension,
and nancial crises in donor economies. For instance, the execution of donor pledges was
a¤ected by the global nancial crisis which started in 2008 such that in 2011/12 only
25% of pledges were released (World Bank, 2013). This risk is further compounded by
the fact that pre-payment mechanisms such as taxes or universal medical insurance have
limited scope for growth in Malawi. All this then points to a strong possibility that going
forward, Malawis health care nancing system will shift towards full cost recovery or
cost sharing arrangements. This in turn suggests that in order to mitigate against the
nancing risks, and although the share of OOP health care spending is relatively low, it
is likely to increase rather than decrease in the future.
3.2 Data and variable description
The data used in the paper come from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3)
conducted by Malawis National Statistical O¢ ce (NSO). This is a multi-topic survey
which is statistically designed to be representative at both national, district, urban and
rural levels. It was conducted from March 2010 to March 2011. The survey collected
information from a random sample of 12271 households which are located in a random
sample of 768 communities. The household level information collected includes socioeco-
nomic and demographic characteristics of households and individual household members.
It also collected household level data on OOP health care payments to cover: medicines
(including non-prescription medicines), tests, consultation, cost of travel to a medical
facility, in-patient fees, preventative health care, pre-natal visits, check-ups, out-patient
costs, and hospitalization costs including the cost of stay at a traditional healers or faith
healers dwelling. Information on a range of community-level variables and conditions
such as access to and availability of physical infrastructure and public services was col-
lected through interviewing key informants in each community. I consider the household
as the unit of analysis.
In keeping with the previous literature (e.g. Su et al., 2006; Pal, 2012; Li et al., 2012;
Narc¬et al., 2014), I use, as my dependent variable, the share of health spending in a
households nondiscretionary expenditure or capacity to pay (Xu et al., 2003; Wagsta¤
and van Doorslaer, 2003), which is dened as per capita total household expenditure net
of per capita expenditure on food. Since the data used in the study were collected from
di¤erent locations and times of the year, the dependent variable is converted into real
values by using a temporal and spatial deator. As argued by ODonnell et al.(2008),
researchers should not impose their own judgment but rather should present results for a
range of values of the threshold, and let the reader choose where to give more weight. The
paper adopts the following two thresholds; 10% and 20%. It should be pointed out that
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the existing literature, commonly uses 40% when nondiscretionary expenditure is used as
the denominator (e.g. Xu et al., 2003). The choice of the lower thresholds is motivated
by the fact that as noted earlier, Malawis health services are to a large extent free, and
therefore lower thresholds would be more appropriate.
Table 1 reports results on the pattern of OOP health care payments. The distribution
of the share of OOP is highly right skewed with the mean about ten times the median.
The asymmetry in the distribution of the share is further conrmed by the Gini coe¢ -
cient which is about 0.8; suggesting that few households register high OOP shares. The
coe¢ cient of variation for the OOP share is greater than two, and this implies that health
care payments are highly unpredictable. The concentration index is negative, indicating
that poor households spend a larger fraction of their resources on health care.
I now turn to the independent variables included in the regressions. Household size
is a potential determinant of catastrophic health payments. As argued by ODonnell et
al. (2005), the sign of the e¤ect of household size on health care payments is ambiguous,
because on the one hand, in the case of a contagious disease, the proportion of a household
that is sick will be greater for larger households, on the other hand, larger households
have a larger supply of informal carers that can substitute for formal medical care and so
constrain health costs. In keeping with Pradhan and Prescott (2002), I include the age
composition of the household as a proxy for health care needs. Health care needs vary
with age in that households with young children and elderly persons are more likely to
spend on health care. The age and sex of the household head are also included in the
model.
The higher the household income, the higher is the households capacity to pay for
health care. I use the log of per capita household expenditure as a measure of house-
hold economic status. The asset index might still su¤er from omitted variable bias if a
household experienced health shocks which led to the depletion of assets, and an increase
in health expenditure. This problem is resolved by including a variable which captures
whether or not in the last 12 months, a household was a¤ected by a serious illness or
accident of household member(s).
Education is another important variable that might a¤ect OOP health payments. An
educated household may make more e¤ective use of modern medicine, and, this e¢ ciency
e¤ect of education (Grossman, 1999; Cowell, 2006), implies that households with higher
levels of schooling may be less likely to incur large expenditures on self-medication and
traditional therapies (ODonnell et al., 2005). The e¤ect of education on catastrophic
payments is captured by education-sex variables which reect the qualications of males
and females in a household. This gender di¤erentiation reects the fact that the returns
to male and female education may be signicantly di¤erent. The number of chronically
ill members in a household is included to capture the possibility that the presence in a
household of members who su¤er from chronic illnesses could lead to more health care
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payments which in turn would increase the likelihood of incurring catastrophic payments
(Su et al.,. 2006; Li et al., 2012). Household living conditions can a¤ect health care
payments to the extent that hygienic home environments lower the likelihood of catching
diseases. I use the availability of sanitary toilets, safe drinking water and solid housing
with durable roof and walls in a household as measures of household living conditions.
In order to measure availability of and access to basic medical infrastructure and ser-
vices in a community, I use community level medical infrastructure indices. The presence
of medical infrastructure and services in a community would for instance entail better
living conditions, which in turn would lead to a lower prevalence of diseases, and hence,
lower medical expenses. The two indices are constructed by using multiple correspondence
analysis (MCA) (see e.g. Asselin (2002) and Blasius and Greenacre (2006) for more de-
tails). The health infrastructure index is constructed from information on the availability
in a community of the following: a place to purchase common medicines, a health clinic, a
nurse, midwife or medical assistant, and groups or programs providing insecticide-treated
mosquito bed nets free or at low cost. I also include rural-urban and regional xed e¤ects
to capture locational di¤erences in OOP health care payments. More detailed descriptions
and summary statistics for all the independent variables are reported in Table 2.
4 Results
4.1 Probit and linear regression results
The results for the empirical application are obtained in three steps: rst, I estimate
a probit model of catastrophic health payments, second, I generate predicted household
specic probabilities of catastrophic health payments from the probit, and then nally,
these predicted probabilities are used to estimate a linear model using ordinary least
squares. Table 3 shows a comparison between predicted headcounts from the linear model
and actual headcounts based on the raw data. It also reports correlation coe¢ cients
of predicted probabilities from the probit and predicted probabilities from the linear
model. The headcounts are qualitatively similar in magnitude. This nding also holds
for the distribution-sensitive headcounts. The correlation coe¢ cients of the predicted
probabilities are positive and signicantly high. All this implies that the partial e¤ects
approximation as represented by the linear model is a good one.
The suitability of the linear approximation is further examined by comparing marginal
e¤ects from the linear and probit models. In both cases, the marginal e¤ects measure
how the probability of a household incurring catastrophic health payments is a¤ected
by di¤erent regressors. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4. Again,
the marginal e¤ects from the two models are similar in both sign and magnitude. This
conclusion is independent of threshold adopted. Furthermore, the signs of the marginal
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e¤ects conform to apriori expectations.
4.2 Mean e¤ect results
Tables 5 and 6 present distribution-sensitive and distribution-insensitive partial mean
e¤ects using the 10% and 20% thresholds of catastrophic health payment respectively.
The tables also contain concentration indices of the regressors. The results indicate that
concentration indices are fairly large in magnitude, and they are also statistically di¤erent
from zero. The signs of the concentration indices are di¤erent; and this implies that the
distribution of the regressors is either in favour of rich households (if the sign is positive)
or poor households (if the sign is negative).
As expected, the results show that there is a high concentration among rich households
of for example: education, good housing conditions, and health infrastructure. In contrast,
there is a high concentration among poor households of for example: health shocks, young
and eldery household members. The presence of these income-related inequalities in the
regressors means that a failure to account for these inequalities by simply using marginal
e¤ects from a probit or logit model would at least normatively lead to a mismeasurement
of the magnitudes of their partial e¤ects. A comparison of the distribution-sensitive and
distribution-insensitive partial e¤ects indicates that the extent of this mismeasurement
depends on the size as well as the sign of the concentration index.
The di¤erences in the distribution-sensitive and distribution-insensitive partial mean
e¤ects are tested for statistical signicance Two things are noteworthy about the statistical
signicance test results. Firstly, allowing for distribution sensitivity leads to statistically
signicant di¤erences between the two partial e¤ects for some variables. Secondly, the
statistical signicance of the di¤erences depends on the threshold used. The di¤erences
become insignicant as one moves from the lower threshold of 10% to the higher threshold
of 20%. This simply reects the fact in the Malawian context, with a free health deliv-
ery system, relatively fewer households would be expected to incur catastrophic health
spending for higher thresholds.
I now take a closer at the results for individual variables. Regardless of threshold used,
the results indicate that education plays an important role in reducing the likelihood of
catastrophic health payments. Since education is distributed in favour of rich households,
a failure to account for this leads to overstated partial e¤ects. For instance, using the 10%
threshold, the results show that the extent of the overestimation is sizable, it ranges from
17% to 56%. The overestimation by the distribution-neutral partial e¤ects for education
are statistically signicant across the two thresholds. The results further reveal that the
size of the partial e¤ects are gendered. The number of females in a household relative
to males with either junior or senior secondary qualications have a larger e¤ect on the
probability of catastrophic health payments. This nding is consistent with previous
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studies (e.g. Pal, 2012) which nd that female literacy matters more for health outcomes.
The e¤ect of household size on health care payments is positive and statistically
signicant for both thresholds. This perhaps reects the possibility that in the case of a
contagious disease, the number of household members who are sick might be greater for
larger households (ODonnell et al., 2005). Since large household sizes are concentrated
among the poor, the results indicate that a failure to control for this distributional pattern
underestimates the size of the partial e¤ect. For instance, using the 10% threshold, the
distribution-insensitive partial e¤ect is 0.0069, but this rises to 0.0076 after controlling
for income-related inequalities in household size.
There is a signicant positive relationship between health care needs as captured
by the number of young and elderly household members, and catastrophic health pay-
ments. Health care needs are distributed to the disadvantage of poor households, hence,
the distribution-sensitive partial e¤ects are larger than the distribution-insensitive partial
e¤ects. The di¤erences between the two e¤ects are statistically signicant for the two
thresholds. Regardless of choice of threshold, the results show that households with a
larger number of chronically ill members are more likely than others to incur catastrophic
health expenditures. The distribution of chronic illness is biased in favour of better o¤
households, and its magnitude though statistically signicant, is quantitatively insubstan-
tial. Consequently, if one was to simply use marginal e¤ects from a probit, the e¤ect of
chronic illness would be overestimated by about 2% only; and this overestimation is found
to be statistically insignicant.
The distribution of health shocks is biased against poor households. As a result,
although the partial e¤ects are positive and statistically signicant, they are larger when
they are adjusted for the socioeconomic distribution of health shocks. Household living
conditions as captured by the availability of a durable roof and walls, and the availability
of a toilet have a statistically signicant negative inuence on the likelihood of catastrophic
health care payments. As expected, the distribution of good household living conditions is
favourable to better o¤ households. As a result, at least from a social welfare perspective,
the distribution-insensitive mean e¤ects of household living conditions are overstated.
However, this overstatement is statistically signicant for the availability of a durable
roof and walls only.
Irrespective of the threshold used, richer households are more likely to incur catastrophic
health expenditures. Three possible explanations can be o¤ered for this nding. First, it
could be that poor people fail recognize that they are ill, as a result, they do not make
use of health care services through payments. Second, it could also be in the presence
low insurance coverage or credit constraints, poor people simply forgo treatment when
they become ill. Finally, it could be that, better o¤ households, go for expensive medical
procedures, which in turn lead to larger medical bills. Although the distribution sensitive
and insensitive mean are e¤ects are statistically signicant, allowing for inequalities in
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household consumption reduces the measured e¤ect of household economic status on the
incidence of catastrophic health spending. Further to this, the reduction in the e¤ect
is statistically for the 20% threshold only. Signicantly, all this points to the useful-
ness of adjusting the partial e¤ects for distribution, as household economic status should
normatively have a smaller e¤ect on the incidence of catastrophic health payments.
Holding other things constant, the availability of health infrastructure such as clinics
in a community increases the prevalence of catastrophic health payments. Perhaps re-
ecting the possibility that rich households are more likely to demand better services, the
availability of health infrastructure is distributed in favour of the better o¤. Thus, the
distribution-sensitive partial e¤ects across the two thresholds are smaller. However, allow-
ing for distribution sensitivity in the mean e¤ect of health infrastructure leads signicantly
lower e¤ects only when the 10% threshold is used. Household location matters when it
comes to health care payments. Relative to urban households, rural households have a
higher incidence of catastrophic health payments. This perhaps reects price di¤erences
in medical care between rural and urban areas.
4.3 Inequality e¤ect results
The above results have shown how the partial mean e¤ects can be underestimated or
overestimated if income-related inequalities in regressors are not accounted for. The next
issue that I look at is how the income-related inequalities in regressors in and of themselves
a¤ect the incidence of catastrophic health spending. The results for this analysis are
presented in Table 7. The results also include combined e¤ect of a ceteris paribus unit
increase in the mean and inequality e¤ects. The signs of the combined e¤ects are mixed;
for some variables the inequality e¤ect dominates the mean e¤ect while for other variables
a reverse pattern is observed.
The results show that, holding all else xed, increases in income-related inequalities
in education i.e. an increase in the concentration of education among the rich, increases
the prevalence of catastrophic health payments. This reects the fact that education
and the likelihood of catastrophic health spending are negatively related. This means the
inequality and the mean e¤ects have countervailing impacts on the catastrophic payments.
Using the 10% threshold, and looking at the number of females with a junior secondary
qualication, the mean e¤ect is -0.0133, and the inequality e¤ect is 0.0015. The combined
e¤ect of a ceteris paribus unit increase in the two is -.0118; thus, the change in inequality
has to be larger (more than 0.0133) for the incidence of catastrophic payments to increase.
Similar to the mean e¤ects, these inequality e¤ects have a gender dimension. Across the
two thresholds, the sizes of the e¤ects are larger for the number of females in a household
relative to males with either junior or senior secondary qualications.
There is a statistically signicant negative relationship between the incidence of
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catastrophic health payments and income-related inequalities in household health care
needs as measured by the number of young and elderly household members. An increase
in the concentration of health care needs among the rich, representing an increase in
inequality, is associated with a reduction in the headcount because of the positive rela-
tionship between health care needs and the probability of catastrophic health payments.
The results further indicate that the combined inequality and mean e¤ect is dominated
by the mean e¤ect. For instance, employing the 10% threshold, the combined e¤ect of a
ceteris paribus unit increase in the two for the number of children below 5, is 0.0047. This
suggests that improvements in the average levels of health care needs are more e¤ective
in reducing catastrophic payments than e¤orts that focus on improving the distribution
of health care needs.
Income inequality and the incidence of catastrophic health payments have a statisti-
cally signicant positive relationship. Increasing income inequality, ceteris paribus, leads
to increasing prevalence of catastrophic health payments. The combined mean and in-
equality e¤ects of household economic status is negative for both thresholds; this means
that substantial improvements is income distribution would be required for the incidence
of catastrophic spending to decline. The results also show that increasing inequality in
household living conditions as measured by the availability of a durable roof and walls,
and the availability of a toilet lead to increasing catastrophic health payments. However,
the combined inequality and mean e¤ect is negative and statistically signicant across
the two thresholds, implying that in order to e¤ectively reduce catastrophic payments,
attention should be more focused on improving the availability of better living conditions
rather than their distribution.
Regardless of the choice of threshold, income-related inequalities in health infrastruc-
ture have a negative and statistically signicant relationship with the prevalence of catastrophic
health payments. The combined inequality and mean e¤ect is negative and signicant for
the two thresholds. This means that the inequality e¤ect dominates the mean e¤ect, con-
sequently, reductions in the distribution of health infrastructure such as the availability
of clinics, are more e¤ective in reducing catastrophic payments.
5 Concluding Comments
The paper has developed distribution-sensitive partial mean e¤ects of determinants of
out-of-pocket (OOP) catastrophic health payments. It has also proposed methods that
can be used to measure how changes in the distribution of the correlates of catastrophic
health payments a¤ect the incidence of catastrophic health payments, an inequality e¤ect.
The proposed methods have then applied to Malawian data from the Third Integrated
Household Survey.
The empirical application has shown that a failure to account for these inequalities in
14
the correlates, at least normatively, leads to a mismeasurement of the magnitudes of their
partial e¤ects. The results also indicate that the signs of the combined e¤ects of a ceteris
paribus unit increase in the mean and inequality e¤ects are mixed; for some variables the
inequality e¤ect dominates the mean e¤ect while for other variables a reverse pattern is
observed.
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Table 1: OOP payments for health care as a percentage of non-food expenditure
Statistic Share of non-food expenditure
Mean 3.690
Median 0.341
Coefficient of variation 2.102
Concentration index -0.036
Gini coefficient 0.781
Observations 12271
Note: sample weights are applied in the computation of all statistics to give population estimates
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Description Mean SD
male Sex of household head (male=1, female=0) 0.76 0.43
age Age of household head in years 42.17 16.22
jce_female Number of females aged 20-59 with JCE 0.07 0.28
jce_male Number of males aged 20-59 with JCE 0.11 0.33
msce_female Number of females aged 20-59 with MSCE 0.04 0.22
msce_male Number of males aged 20-59 with MSCE 0.09 0.32
size Household size 4.56 2.21
num_5 Number of members under 5 years old 0.91 0.92
num_60 Number of members over 60 years old 0.24 0.53
lcap_exp_total log of per capita households expenditure 10.72 0.79
chronic Number suffering from chronic illness 0.24 0.53
shock Household affected by health shock (1=yes, 0=no) 0.12 0.33
wall_durable House has durable wall (1=yes, 0=no) 0.79 0.41
roof_durable House has durable roof (1=yes, 0=no) 0.36 0.48
toilet House has a toilet (1=yes, 0=no) 0.91 0.29
health_index Index of health infrastructure 2.38 1.17
north Regional dummy, north=1 0.19 0.39
centre Regional dummy, centre=1 0.34 0.47
south Regional dummy, south=1, base 0.47 0.50
rural Rural-urban dummy, rural=1 if rural 0.82 0.39
Observations 12271
Notes: JCE is Junior Certificate of Education, and it is a junior secondary certificate. MSCE is Malawi School
Certificate of Education, and it is a senior secondary certificate.
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Table 3: Comparison of actual and predicted catastrophic payments
Threshold Headcount Concentration Rank-Adjusted Headcount
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Threshold=10% 11.33 11.33 -0.045 -0.050 11.84 11.90
Threshold= 20% 4.27 4.27 -0.012 -0.023 4.32 4.37
Threshold=10% Correlation 0.97
Threshold= 20% Correlation 0.93
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